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The Law of Libel Continues to Develop
-An

Introduction

Elmer Gertz*
This is the latest in a series of law review issues devoted entirely
to the examination of defamation. Since 1964, numerous articles
have been written about New York Times v. Sullivan, the case rendering defamation a constitutional issue.' In the twelve years since
the Supreme Court handed down its landmark opinion in my libel
case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' at least 200 articles dealing at
length with that case have appeared. The literature about libel is
enormous, and there seems to be no end in sight, as the courts continue to refine and re-define the reaches and dimensions of the constitutional guidelines.
Yet it is little more than a score of years since the Supreme
Court decided suddenly that defamation is governed by the first
amendment. And, truth to tell, the subject is intrinsically less important than many areas of the laws of torts, contracts, property, personal relations, crime, and much else.
The public seldom becomes excited about cases involving stupendous sums and highly involved issues of property law. But every
libel case involving a famous or notorious individual and powerful
media organizations attracts attention, sometimes to the same degree
as the more outrageous criminal cases. For example, when General
Westmoreland sued CBS, when General Sharon sued Time magazine, and when Carol Burnett sued the National Enquirer, pages
were devoted to every detail of the litigation. In an earlier day,
Henry Ford's libel action against the Chicago Tribune was widely
publicized. Elsewhere in the English speaking world, there was great
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excitement over such legal struggles, sometimes with wholly unexpected results. The tragedy of Oscar Wilde in the last years of the
nineteenth century grew out of the unsuccessful libel action against
the Marquis of Queensberry. This case has had great repercussions
in literary circles and in the gay community to this very day. I, myself, born several years after Wilde's death, was attacked by his son
in a book because of what I had written to Lord Alfred Douglas, the
young companion of Wilde. Douglas, incidentally, made a career of
bringing libel actions. When he defamed Winston Churchill, he was
imprisoned.
What is there about libel that arouses such pique and passion?
As Shylock observed, reputation is a priceless gift; and it is defended
often with the zeal that one fights for one's life. Money may be
trash, but reputation is everything.
Results in libel cases often depend upon time and place. Take
the Sharon case 8 as an example. Since the controversial Israeli general was clearly a public person, if not an official, when he filed his
action against Time Magazine in New York, he had to prove defamation, falsehood, and actual malice as defined in the New York
Times case in order to recover. He proved defamation and falsehood.
Sharon, however, technically lost the case because he did not prove
malice. But did he lose? Sharon had a suit pending in Israel on the
same set of facts. The Israeli court said that defamation and falsehood had been established in the New York court and would be assumed in Israel. Moreover, since malice need not be proved in order
to recover in Israel, Sharon was not faced with this formidable obstacle to recovery. He was, therefore, entitled to judgment. At that
point, Time, which claimed a victory in America, chose to capitulate
and acknowledged the complete inaccuracy of its report and agreed
to pay Sharon's costs in an undisclosed amount.
In many areas of the United States, Sharon would have been
confronted with the single publication doctrine, which confines a
claimant to one suit, rather than a multiplicity of actions. In some
localities, as in Illinois, the innocent construction rule might be a
factor, which precludes recovery as a matter of law, when words can
reasonably be given an innocent construction, regardless of whether
they may also be given an actionable construction.
It is generally assumed that the constitutional restrictions in
defamation began with New York Times. This is not entirely true.
Fair comment was always within the protection of the first amendment, subject to certain limitations. Malice precluded the defense,
but malice in this situation is not the same as actual malice in the
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present constitutional sense. Ill will in the normal tort sense barred
the fair comment defense. Similarly, when the defamatory declaration is truthful, it is not a defense in most jurisdictions unless the
truth is uttered for laudable purposes and justifiable ends. It should
be noted that Justice Powell, who wrote the Court's opinion in the
Gertz case, opined in another case, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn,4 that truth is constitutionally a defense in all cases, although
the majority of the Court has yet to agree with him.
Admittedly, malice, in the New York Times sense, is difficult to
prove, since it is so subjective in essence. The Court, therefore, held
in Herbert v. Lando' that a plaintiff has a very broad right to discovery in order to prove malice. Then, fearing that juries would be too
likely to find malice because of lack of sympathy with the media, the
Court, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,' held that every finding of
malice is subject to constitutional review.
These decisions are typical of the course of the law in this difficult area. First, the Court limited public officials in the recovery.
Next, it subjected public figures to the same restrictions as public
officials. Finally, the Court seemed to be saying, in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia,7 that even private individuals, involved in matters of
public concern, had to prove actual malice. However, in the Gertz
case, it backtracked and held that private persons had to prove fault,
as defined by state law, and actual injuries, as more broadly defined.
At this point, the matter seemed to rest until the plurality opinion in
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,8 in which the majority
held that Gertz was confined to matters of public concern. In other
words, private individuals not involved in matters of public concern
could recover under common law rules, so that neither fault nor malice had to be proved in order to recover compensatory and punitive
damages for utterances of no public importance. The Court concluded by stating that all expression is not entitled to the same first
amendment protection; that there are degrees of entitlement. If the
defamatory utterance concerns matters that are purely private then
it is not protected by the Gertz rule.
This, clearly, is not the end of the line. Unresolved issues remain, such as whether the Gertz holding is confined to the media
and not other private entities or individuals; whether the burden of
proving truth or falsity rests upon the plaintiff or defendant; and
whether truth is a defense. Of possibly greater importance is whether
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or not Time v. HilP has been superceded by Gertz, rendering privacy subject to the same rules as libel. That certainty would tend
towards consistentcy.
The general direction of the court seems to favor protecting the
reputational and privacy rights of private individuals, rather than enlarging the freedom of the press. There has been a retreat from the
absolute freedom of expression supported by Justices Black, Douglas
and Brennan. Even Justice Brennan thought I was a private person,
rather than a public figure, although he dissented from the basic
holding of the Gertz case. Additionally, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc,1" the Court made it easier for plaintiffs to shop for more
favorable jurisdictions, thus avoiding shorter limitation periods and
other restrictions.
There is a basic premise in the Gertz case that troubles me, as
does a similar premise in the obscenity cases. The Court has set
down constitutional guidelines in both areas, based upon the overriding effect of the first amendment. I reason that there is only one first
amendment, just as there is only one federal constitution. Both are
binding upon all, regardless of geographical considerations. Yet, the
Court has said that the states are free to choose their own standards
of fault in defamation, and that community standards govern in obscenity cases. Does this not seem like fragmentation of constitutional
rights and duties? I remember how amused and annoyed I was when
the Chief Justice wrote in Miller v. California,1" that although there
is only one first amendment, it is nevertheless unreasonable to give it
the same meaning in all jurisdictions-that Las Vegas is different
from some rural county or small town community.
The libel decisions since New York Times have been based upon
the assumption that the press must be protected against the chilling
effects of litigation, which is often excessively expensive and always
uncertain in its results. This assumption, it seems to me, misses the
point that all litigation is a nuisance at best, and disastrous at worst.
That is the risk that one takes in living in a relatively free country,
where litigation is commonplace. The courts are left to resolve the
situation as best they can.
To eliminate or restrict punitive damages is not the answer.
Some libel scholars are beginning to ask if the whole fabric created
by the Supreme Court in the last two decades does much good for
the media or anyone else. There is likely to be a reexamination of
the cases in the next generation, and one cannot be sure where this
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will lead. The experts who write so learnedly on this issue and others
like them probably will be helpful in resolving the issues. But as I
have said half-seriously in perusing the many articles about my own
famous case, I don't know whether they enlighten or simply confuse
me. Do we get divine guidance from ecclesiastics, where the
preacher says that much reading is a weariness of the flesh?
Much libel litigation is certainly a burden upon the flesh and
purse of all those involved, not only for the media, which generally
wins out in the end. My own landmark case came to a triumphant
end, but it took almost fifteen years from start to finish. Were I not a
lawyer myself, it is doubtful that I could have persisted. Consider a
few simple facts. I won the first time before a jury, but the trial
court set aside the jury's verdict. I lost in the court of appeals and
had to go to the highest court in order to prevail on the law. This
meant that I had to go back to the district court once again, and it
took six or seven years to get a retrial of the matter. At this stage, I
was confronted with what might have been a disastrous surprise.
Whereas the Supreme Court had indicated that I need only prove
simple negligence, on retrial the district court allowed a last minute
special plea of fair comment, and held that I had to prove malice as
well as negligence. True, I prevailed, but the case had to go again to
the court of appeals, and then the Supreme Court. How many could
have been both patient and affluent enough to persist?
The enormous difficulties I encountered were not confined to my
own case. On more than one occasion I had to struggle for almost as
long in other libel cases and in one instance going from the trial
court, to the appellate court, to the state supreme court, and back
again to the trial court before there was finally a compromise. It was
worse even than that. At first, I lost in the state supreme court and
prevailed only on a motion for rehearing. I suspect that this was a
once in several thousand result. How can the private litigant afford
this? The truth is that in this litigious nation all of us must pay a
considerable price for the redemption of our rights. In all areas of
the law, not only in libel litigation, we must find ways and means of
reducing the burden.
It is generally conceded that libel, being a personal action, dies
with the person. But why should this be so? At least one jurisdiction
has held that the action survives. Suppose there is a judgment on the
merits, but no adjudication as to damages, does the action survive?
Some have proposed that instead of judgments in money damages for defamation there be declarations of the falsity of the reflections upon reputations, required publication of refutations, and possibly repayment of costs and of actual pecuniary losses. Justice Walter

V. Schaefer, formerly chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, is
among those who have proposed such redress. It is difficult to be sure
of the practical effect of this course.
Others would extend the scope of libel actions beyond the individual directly affected. They would give defamed groups, or possibly
the states, the right to take action, civil and criminal, against the
defamers. The argument is propounded that there must be recourse
for the circulation of utterly inflammatory and mischievous publications, such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion; the lies against
Jews printed in Henry Ford's magazine, the Dearborn Independent;
the false claim of so-called Holocaust "revisionists" who brazenly allege that Hitler never murdered six million European Jews; the Nazi
marches in Chicago and Skokie; and other outrageous defamations
of Jews, blacks, and others. The courts have always held that words
that clearly incite deadly action by individuals or damage to the
State must not be protected by reason of any unreasonable belief in
absolute freedom of expression. As a matter of fact, the Supreme
Court, in Beauharnaisv. Illinois,12 upheld what amounted to criminal sanctions against group libel. If group libel statutes are sustained, there would be very serious problems raised regarding the
parties, the proof, and the punishment. In the drafting of the new
Illinois Constitution, in which I had the privilege of participating as
chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee of the Convention, there is
a condemnation of disparagement of groups by reason of race, religion, nationality, sex or religion. However, critics argue that the provision is merely a constitutional sermon, rather than anything enforceable in the courts. What is the answer? What, indeed, are the
best answers to other problems in the area of defamation? The authors of the essays contained in this issue attempt answers.
In the previously mentioned Henry Ford libel case, the esteemed
automobile manufacturer opined that "history is bunk." In a sense,
everything is so subjective that truth is as difficult to define as Pontius Pilate stated millenia ago. Each of the writers gives his view of
the truth about libel, some with more certainty than others. We may
be sure that the conflict of views in this area of the law will never
end.
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